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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 11-1714 
______________ 
 
In re:  Bayside Prison Litigation 
 
JEFFREY MORTON, 
 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BAYSIDE STATE PRISON 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 97-05127) 
Honorable Robert B. Kugler, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 11, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 17, 2012) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal by plaintiff Jeffrey Morton 
from an order entered on February 14, 2011, denying his motion under Federal Rule of 
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Civil Procedure 60(b) to vacate a District Court order entered May 18, 1999, dismissing 
with prejudice his case arising from his incarceration at the Bayside State Prison in New 
Jersey.  The Court entered the May 18, 1999 order because Morton twice failed to submit 
a pretrial memorandum within the time fixed for its submission.  After entry of the 
February 14, 2011 order, Morton moved for its reconsideration but the Court denied that 
motion with an order and accompanying opinion entered July 21, 2011.  The Court in its 
July 21, 2011 opinion set forth the background of this matter at length but we 
nevertheless summarize its pertinent history.
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 This case arose from the homicide of a corrections officer on July 30, 1997, at the 
Bayside State Prison, an event that led corrections officials to take protective measures 
which included an inmate lockdown.  These measures triggered responsive litigation 
from certain inmates that Morton describes as “a fourteen year saga involving fourteen 
jury trials, numerous appeals, and hundreds of claims referred to and heard (by consent) 
before a Special Master in streamlined proceedings.”  Appellant’s Br. at 3.  Morton 
initiated his participation in this massive litigation by the rather commonplace step of 
filing a pro se complaint on March 2, 1998, in the District Court, docketed as Civ. No. 
97-5609, in which he complained that he had been assaulted during the lockdown.  
Morton moved for the appointment of counsel but the Court denied that motion on May 
8, 1998.  Other inmates also filed individual cases as well as a class action arising out of 
the corrections officials’ reaction to the killing.  To manage these multiple actions the 
                                              
1
 Of course, the parties are familiar with the background of this case as there has been a 
great deal of litigation arising from the circumstances which led to Morton filing his 
complaint.  See, e.g., White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305 (D.N.J. 1998). 
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Court on December 31, 1998, entered an order consolidating the cases for the sole 
purpose of case management.  The Court, however, at that time did not provide that the 
individual cases would lose their individual docket numbers though the cases to the 
extent consolidated were entitled “In Re Bayside Prison Litigation” and were docketed as 
Civ. No. 97-5127, the docket number previously assigned to the already pending class 
action.  Finally, on April 9, 2001, the Court consolidated all the Bayside cases for all 
purposes under Civ. No. 97-5127.   
 There were individual proceedings in Morton’s case both before and after the two 
orders for consolidation.  As germane to this appeal, before the partial consolidation the 
clerk of the District Court notified Morton on August 4, 1998, to file a pretrial 
memorandum on or before November 4, 1998, but Morton did not do so.  Subsequently, 
on February 18, 1999, after the partial consolidation but before the total consolidation, in 
keeping with the still individual status of the various cases, a magistrate judge directed 
Morton to file the pretrial memorandum by March 1, 1999, but again Morton did not do 
so.  Consequently, the District Court dismissed Morton’s action with prejudice on May 
18, 1999, in an order docketed in Civ. No. 97-5609, Morton’s individual case.  So far as 
we can ascertain from the docket sheets, the Court did not send that order to any attorney 
as an attorney had not entered an appearance for Morton in Civ. No. 97-5609.  The 
District Court has never vacated or otherwise disturbed the May 18, 1999 order. 
 After the District Court dismissed Morton’s case, the defendants in Civ. No. 97-
5127 moved to dismiss that case and, significantly, in their accompanying brief noted that 
the Court already had dismissed Morton’s case at Civ. No. 97-5609.  Nevertheless, 
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Morton did not move to reinstate his particular claim.  On March 13, 2002, the Court 
denied in part and granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss Civ. No. 97-5127, 
but the order it entered did not address the dismissal order in Morton’s individual case 
which thus remained dismissed.  Finally, on March 3, 2010, more than a decade after the 
Court had dismissed his action, Morton moved to reinstate his case and this motion led to 
the order of February 14, 2011, from which Morton now appeals.
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s denial 
of the Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion.  See Brown v. Philadelphia Housing 
Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003).  There has been an abuse of discretion when a 
district court’s decision is based on a “clearly erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 
146 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Morton indicates that the District Court erred “when it held [that] the motion 
[under Rule 60(b) was] untimely . . . solely [because of] the length of time since the 
original dismissal without consideration of the reasons for the delay” and that the Court 
erred when it refused to grant relief under Rule 60(b) “in light of the exceptional 
circumstances of this case.”  Appellant’s Br. at 1. 
                                              
2
 Morton correctly filed his motion to reinstate his claim in Civ. No. 97-5127 even though 
he had filed his claim in Civ. No. 97-5609 as all the Bayside cases had been consolidated 
for all purposes before he filed the motion.  Consequently, the District Court filed the 
orders of February 14, 2011, and July 21, 2011, in Civ. No. 97-5127. 
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 We recognize that the proceedings in this litigation have been very complex so 
that it is understandable that there has been confusion in the prosecution of the case.  Yet 
Morton explains in his brief that “[i]n February of 2004, in response to an inquiry by 
Plaintiff’s Counsel Defendants’ counsel provided Plaintiff’s counsel with a copy of the 
order entered by [the District Court] on May [18,] 1999.”  Appellant’s Br. at 6-7.  
Nevertheless, even though the May 18, 1999 order dismissed his case neither Morton nor 
any attorney on his behalf filed a motion to have Morton’s case reinstated until March 3, 
2010.  In these circumstances, and for the reasons that the District Court set forth in its 
July 21, 2011 opinion, we cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion when it 
entered the order of February 14, 2011, and adhered to that order on July 21, 2011. 
 The order of February 14, 2011, will be affirmed. 
